Fordham Law Review
Volume 84

Issue 2

Article 7

2015

Cross-Border Corruption Enforcement: A Case for Measured
Coordination Among Multiple Enforcement Authorities
Jay Holtmeier
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jay Holtmeier, Cross-Border Corruption Enforcement: A Case for Measured Coordination Among Multiple
Enforcement Authorities, 84 Fordham L. Rev. 493 (2015).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol84/iss2/7

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

CROSS-BORDER CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT:
A CASE FOR MEASURED COORDINATION
AMONG MULTIPLE
ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES
Jay Holtmeier*
INTRODUCTION
The steady increase in cooperation and information sharing among
governments is a trend commonly noted in discussions of current
anticorruption enforcement.1 There is no shortage of evidence to support
this observation. In 2013 and 2014 alone, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recognized the
cooperation and assistance of foreign law enforcement authorities in at least
twenty-three actions brought under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA or “the Act”).2 U.S. enforcement authorities—once the world’s
primary anticorruption enforcers—increasingly can and do rely on the help
of their international counterparts and are pursuing more investigations that
run concurrently with, or in the wake of, investigations initiated by foreign
authorities.3
This increase in cross-border information sharing and enforcement is
unsurprising given that a growing number of countries are entering the
* Partner, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, and coleader of the firm’s Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act and Anti-Corruption Practice. The author thanks partners Kimberly A.
Parker and Erin G.H. Sloane and special counsel Lillian Howard Potter for their many
insights and their collaboration. The author also thanks senior associates Rebecca Ann
Haciski, Katie Moran, and Jennifer M. Rimm and associate Jared B. Cohen for their tireless
and thoughtful contributions. This Article is part of a symposium entitled Fighting
Corruption in America and Abroad held at Fordham University School of Law. For an
overview of the symposium, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Foreword: Fighting
Corruption in America and Abroad, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 407 (2015).
1. See, e.g., WILMERHALE LLP, GLOBAL ANTI-BRIBERY YEAR-IN-REVIEW: 2014
DEVELOPMENTS AND PREDICTIONS FOR 2015 20–22 (2015), https://www.wilmerhale.com/
uploadedFiles/Shared_Content/Editorial/Publications/WH_Publications/Client_Alert_PDfs/F
CPA%20YIR%20Alert_01%2027%2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/EJG5-WJQ9]; Robb Adkins &
Benjamin Kimberley, The Globalization of Anti-Corruption Enforcement: Recent Trends
and Developments, in INTERNATIONAL WHITE COLLAR ENFORCEMENT 87, 108 (2014).
2. See generally Justice News, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/justicenews (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/Q33E-DXN9]; Press Releases, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressreleases (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/99CK66AZ]. This count includes only cases where the DOJ or SEC publicly and affirmatively
acknowledged such cooperation; the true number of cases resolved with the cooperation of
foreign authorities is probably greater.
3. See WILMERHALE LLP, supra note 1.
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anticorruption fray as independent players, either by passing antibribery
laws or by stepping up enforcement of existing laws.4 Of the forty-one
present members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention” or
“the Convention”), which requires state signatories to implement legislation
criminalizing bribery of foreign public officials,5 only twenty member
states had such laws on the books at the time the Convention came into
force in 1999—the other twenty-one have passed such legislation since
then.6 The number of non-U.S. enforcement actions concerning bribery of
foreign officials has more than doubled since 2012, and, in 2014, for the
first time, such actions outnumbered U.S. enforcement actions.7 The
United Kingdom has recently become an active prosecutor of foreign
bribery, passing the U.K. Bribery Act in 2010 and playing an increasingly
aggressive and effective role in enforcement through its Serious Fraud
Office8 (SFO).
Enforcement in other countries has followed a similar trajectory, and not
only in the developed Western world. In mid-2013, Brazil entered the
foreign anticorruption arena with the enactment of the Clean Company Act,
which prohibits bribery of foreign officials by companies that operate in
Brazil as well as by their affiliates around the world.9 In 2015, Brazil filed
charges against nearly forty individuals in connection with investigations of
corruption at Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (“Petrobras”), a Brazilian energy
company, and Embraer S.A., a Brazilian aircraft manufacturer—both of
which are also reportedly under investigation in the United States for FCPA
violations.10
China, another relatively new player in the anticorruption enforcement
arena, amended its corruption law in 2011, making it illegal to bribe
government officials overseas in an effort to secure “improper” commercial
benefits.11 In 2014, Chinese authorities made headlines by fining the
4. Gwendolyn L. Hassan, The Increasing Risk of Multijurisdictional Bribery
Prosecution: Why Having an FCPA Compliance Program Is No Longer Enough, 42 INT’L
L. NEWS 12, 14–15 (2013).
5. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions art. 1, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD
Convention].
6. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. [OECD], OECD FOREIGN BRIBERY
REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRIME OF BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS 11 (2014).
7. TRACE INT’L, INC., GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT REPORT 2014 8 (2015).
8. See id. at 6–7; Corruption by Country: United Kingdom, TRANSPARENCY
INTERNATIONAL, http://www.transparency.org/country/#GBR_Overview (last visited Oct. 21,
2015) [http://perma.cc/MWY3-DG8M].
9. Decreto No. 12.846, de 1 del Augusto de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.]
de 2.08.2013 (Braz.).
10. Trace Compendium, TRACE INT’L, https://www.traceinternational2.org/compendium
(search entries for “Petroleo Brasileiro SA” and “Embraer”) (last visited Oct. 21, 2015)
[hereinafter Trace Compendium] [http://perma.cc/S9BV-HZWB].
11. Zhong hua ren min gong he guo xing fa xiu zheng an (ba)
(中华人民共和国刑法修正案(八)) [Eighth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
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Chinese subsidiary of British pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline
plc (GSK) a record three billion yuan (approximately $489 million) for
allegedly bribing doctors to prescribe GSK drugs.12 In addition to bringing
criminal charges against GSK, Chinese authorities brought criminal charges
against five individuals, including former GSK China executive Mark
Reilly and four other managers, all of whom received prison sentences.13
U.S. authorities, who are also reportedly investigating GSK,14 have not
taken action at this time.
As these and other foreign authorities increasingly investigate and
proscribe bribery, concurrent investigations and prosecutions by multiple
countries, once considered a “trend,” will become a fixture in the global
anticorruption enforcement landscape. In some sense, this outcome is
precisely what the United States and anticorruption organizations such as
the OECD and Transparency International (TI) have advocated for many
years: with multiple countries starting to pull their weight in efforts to root
out and punish corrupt practices, the international community is moving
toward developing a coordinated effort to deter bribery in international
As more and more countries enter the anticorruption
business.15
enforcement arena, however, it will become increasingly common that one
incident of alleged misconduct will trigger years of parallel or successive
enforcement actions and, in some cases, duplicative penalties by different
authorities. When overlapping jurisdiction exists, and countries proceed in
isolation, what can result is an unfair, unpredictable, and overly punitive
regime that, in the long run, may prove counterproductive.
This Article takes stock of how international anticorruption enforcement
authorities have addressed these issues and makes proposals for reducing
the potential adverse effects of multijurisdictional prosecutions. Part I
provides an overview of multinational antibribery enforcement efforts. Part
II discusses different approaches to multinational enforcement that
authorities have taken to date. These approaches suggest that some degree
of coordination with respect to resolutions is the norm, although how and
the extent to which different enforcers cooperate with one another varies
widely.

Feb. 25, 2011, effective May 1, 2011), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=145719&lib=
law [http://perma.cc/6FHJ-UBSF].
12. See Hester Plumridge & Laurie Burkitt, GlaxoSmithKline Found Guilty of Bribery in
China, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 19, 2014, 2:15 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
glaxosmithkline-found-guilty-of-bribery-in-china-1411114817
[http://perma.cc/UG9Z7JQS].
13. Id.
14. Adam Jourdan & Aruna Viswanatha, GSK China Consumer Healthcare Unit Linked
to DOJ Probe in 2012, REUTERS (Sept. 9, 2014, 8:02 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/09/09/us-gsk-china-corruption-exclusive-idUSKBN0H407Q20140909 [http://
perma.cc/K9SB-MN4F].
15. See, e.g., OECD, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (Nov. 26, 2009); What Is
Transparency International?, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, http://www.transparency.org/about/
(last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/U99H-ZAJP].
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Part III explores the primary policy reasons counseling against
concurrent or successive anticorruption enforcement actions and in favor of
a single resolution approach. Part IV examines some arguably more
structured approaches that have been adopted to address overlapping
jurisdiction in other contexts, both international and domestic. Finally, this
Article concludes by proposing some general policy recommendations and
guidelines that might help mitigate the risks and potential adverse effects
present in today’s globalized, multinational enforcement regime.
I. MULTIJURISDICTIONAL ANTIBRIBERY ENFORCEMENT:
A PRIMER
Laws prohibiting foreign bribery are extraterritorial by nature, aiming to
regulate conduct that occurs abroad, within a foreign country’s borders.
Such laws thus invite multijurisdictional enforcement, as at least two (if not
more) sovereign nations will typically have some interest in the alleged
crime. At the same time, virtually all countries have domestic bribery laws
prohibiting bribery of local officials (and, in many cases, nongovernment
parties).16 This part considers the various reasons why multiple countries
may seek to prosecute the same instance of bribery and provides some
relevant examples.
A. Interests of Both Supply- and Demand-Side Jurisdictions
in Enforcing Anticorruption Laws
By its nature, any given instance of foreign bribery involves at least two
countries: the bribe-giver’s home country (the supply-side jurisdiction) and
the bribe-receiver’s home country (the demand-side jurisdiction). Several
other jurisdictions also may have an interest in a particular action. For
example, a bribe may involve one or more foreign subsidiaries of a supplyside country’s company, or perpetrators of the unlawful activity may
include various foreign third-party companies or citizens.
Historically, international corruption has been adjudicated primarily by
the supply-side jurisdiction, with the United States leading the charge since
the 1977 enactment of the FCPA.17 Supply-side countries have a selfinterest in policing those companies and individuals that fall under their
jurisdiction. In the United States, for example, the FCPA was passed in the
wake of both the Watergate political scandal and an SEC report that
revealed the prevalence of U.S. companies engaging in bribery and

16. See Homer E. Moyer, Jr., Global Overview, GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH (Mar. 10,
2015), https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/2/article/28825/global-overview/ [http://perma
.cc/LQ23-SV9S].
17. Brian C. Harms, Holding Public Officials Accountable in the International Realm:
A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 159, 171
(2000).
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corruption overseas.18 Chief among the Act’s purposes was to restore and
maintain U.S. integrity and credibility both at home and abroad.19
In addition to the supply-side interest in maintaining integrity in the
global marketplace, supply-side countries generally have an interest in
deterring activity that harms their own economy and citizens. Bribery is
generally thought to undermine employee confidence in the company’s
management and to foster an atmosphere that invites other corporate
misconduct such as embezzlement and financial fraud.20 Once the
misconduct becomes public, the company faces negative press and financial
harm, which in turn harms its shareholders. To the extent that a supply-side
company wins business from a competitor from the same country, the
country’s interest in fair competition for participants in its own economy is
damaged.21 The United States and other supply-side jurisdictions thus
believe they have an interest in making sure their corporate citizens comply
with their laws.22
Ensuring compliance also is an important interest for the countries whose
public officials have been bribed. Demand-side jurisdictions tend to be in
the developing world, and they arguably bear the brunt of the harm caused
by foreign corruption. Citizens of these countries arguably suffer most
because it is their governments that have been corrupted, their local markets
deprived of honest competition, their national public works projects
compromised, and their security jeopardized as ill-gotten funds are funneled
into other criminal endeavors.23
Demand-side jurisdictions also have a particular interest in defending
political integrity and credibility by enforcing their own antibribery laws.
By holding foreign companies and domestic public officials accountable for
corruption, these countries benefit from demonstrating to the market the
legitimacy and enforceability of their laws. And, by maintaining a stable
marketplace where corruption laws are enforced, demand-side countries can
create a competition-friendly environment, which leads to their further
economic development.24
B. “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions
Given the multiplicity of parties with a potential interest in prosecuting
any given foreign corrupt payment, it is not surprising that enforcement
actions by multiple authorities related to the “same” bribery scheme can
18. Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 930,
932 (2012).
19. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2–3 (2012) [hereinafter RESOURCE GUIDE].
20. Id. at 3.
21. See Bruce W. Klaw, A New Strategy for Preventing Bribery and Extortion in
International Business Transactions, 49 HARV. J. LEGIS. 303, 307–08 (2012).
22. See id.
23. See Nikolaus Schuttauf, Repeal Anti-Bribery Legislation? A Defense of Laws
Promoting Clean Business and Transparent Governments, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 617, 646
(2012).
24. Cf. id.
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come in many forms. The most basic—and for reasons explained below,
potentially most problematic—of these is the “carbon copy” prosecution.
This term, coined by Andrew S. Boutros and T. Markus Funk in their
article, “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions:
A Growing Anticorruption
Phenomenon in a Shrinking World, describes successive prosecutions by
multiple sovereigns for the same or similar conduct.25 In the paradigmatic
example of a “carbon copy” prosecution, a company enters into a settlement
with one jurisdiction pursuant to which the company admits that it paid
bribes; subsequently, it is subject to investigation, prosecution, and/or
penalties in another jurisdiction on the basis of these admissions.26
The main advantage for a government bringing a “carbon copy”
prosecution is that, as the second enforcer, it can piggyback off of the
efforts of the original jurisdiction’s prosecutors.27 This can actually
promote anticorruption enforcement efforts, particularly in demand-side
countries that have fewer law enforcement resources and are often less able
to undertake an extensive investigation.28 The drawbacks of these
prosecutions, as several scholars and practitioners have observed, is that
such prosecutions potentially violate the principles of double jeopardy by
imposing duplicative penalties for the same conduct.29
Two prominent examples of duplicative cases in the FCPA context are
the TSKJ/Bonny Island prosecutions and the Panalpina prosecutions. In
2010, the United States settled FCPA charges against four companies—
Kellogg, Brown & Root LLC (KBR, a Halliburton subsidiary);
Eni/Snamprogetti Netherlands BV; JGC Corporation; and Technip, S.A.
(collectively, “the TSKJ consortium”)—arising out of a joint venture that
allegedly bribed Nigerian public officials in exchange for contracts to build
liquefied natural gas facilities on Bonny Island in Nigeria.30 The DOJ and
SEC recovered $1.5 billion in FCPA-related penalties and disgorgement
from the TSKJ consortium.31
Concurrently with the U.S. investigation, Nigeria’s Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) also opened an investigation against
25. Andrew S. Boutros & T. Markus Funk, “Carbon Copy” Prosecutions: A Growing
Anticorruption Phenomenon in a Shrinking World, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 259, 269.
26. See id. at 271–72.
27. See Leah M. Trzcinski, The Impact of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act on
Emerging Markets: Company Decision-Making in a Regulated World, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 1201, 1215 (2013).
28. See id.
29. See id. See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaty Double Jeopardy: The OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention and the FCPA, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1321 (2012).
30. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. Resolves
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $240 Million Criminal
Penalty (July 7, 2010) [hereinafter DOJ, Snamprogetti], http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
snamprogetti-netherlands-bv-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees
[http://perma.cc/P6JD-QLGX]; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, JGC Corporation
Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $218.8 Million
Criminal Penalty (Apr. 6, 2011) [hereinafter DOJ, JGC], http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jgccorporation-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investigation-and-agrees-pay-2188
[http://perma.cc/85UB-RJ2Q].
31. See DOJ, Snamprogetti, supra note 30; DOJ, JGC, supra note 30.

2015]

CROSS-BORDER CORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT

499

the consortium and associated persons for the same corruption scheme.32
The Nigerian government subsequently entered into settlements with the
four companies in exchange for approximately $126 million in fines and
disgorgement.33 In addition, in 2011, the U.K. High Court issued to M.W.
Kellogg Limited (MWKL), KBR’s U.K.-based wholly owned subsidiary, a
civil recovery order for over ₤7 million (approximately $10.8 million),
representing the amount of the “share dividends payable from profits and
revenues generated by contracts obtained by bribery and corruption
undertaken by MWKL’s parent company and others.”34 Additionally, in
2014, the four consortium members agreed to pay penalties totaling $22.7
million to the African Development Bank for bribes related to the same
contracts.35 Finally, in July 2013, an Italian court fined Saipem SA (into
which Snamprogetti merged in 2006) $780,000 and ordered the
confiscation of €24.5 million (approximately $27.4 million) of assets after
finding the company guilty of corruption in connection with the Bonny
Island contracts.36
The Panalpina cases in 2010 and 2011 followed a similar pattern. In
those actions, U.S. authorities settled allegations that the global freight
forwarding company, Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd., along
with five oil-and-gas service companies and subsidiaries, engaged in a
scheme to pay bribes to foreign officials in numerous jurisdictions,
32. See Trace Compendium, supra note 10 (search entry for “snamprogetti” and select
“Eni / Snamprogetti”).
33. The settlement agreements with the Nigerian government are not publicly available.
Halliburton, however, announced that it agreed to pay $35 million to settle all lawsuits and
charges against KBR and Halliburton corporate entities and that the Nigerian government
agreed not to bring any further criminal charges or civil claims against those entities. See
Press Release, Halliburton, Halliburton Confirms Agreement to Settle with Fed. Gov’t of
Nigeria (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.halliburton.com/public/news/pubsdata/press_release/
2010/corpnws_12212010.html [http://perma.cc/2CDQ-59DF].
Snamprogetti allegedly
agreed to pay $32.5 million to have all charges dropped. See UPDATE 1—Saipem Settles
Nigeria Probe for $30 Mln, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2010, 4:11 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/
2010/12/20/saipem-nigeria-idUKLDE6BJ1N020101220
[http://perma.cc/HN48-RVWP].
Sources estimate that Technip and JGC paid approximately $30 million and $28.5 million in
fines, respectively. See StAR Corruption Cases Search Center, STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY
INITIATIVE, http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/ (search entries for “Technip” and
“JGC”) (last visited Oct. 21, 2015) [http://perma.cc/G2U8-LC4D].
34. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, MW Kellogg Ltd to Pay ₤7 Million in SFO
High Court Action (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/press-releasearchive/press-releases-2011/mw-kellogg-ltd-to-pay-7-million-in-sfo-high-court-action.aspx
[http://perma.cc/8UCD-NS3X]. Per this press release, the decision to require restitution of
the corruptly obtained funds was reached by the SFO “working in partnership with the US
Department of Justice” and reflected “the finding that MWKL was used by the parent
company and was not a willing participant in the corruption.” Id.
35. Press Release, African Dev. Bank Group, AfDB Charges Snamprogetti Netherlands
B.V. US $5.7 million in Monetary Sanction for Corrupt Practices (May 28, 2014),
http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/afdb-charges-snamprogetti-netherlands-b-vus-5-7-million-in-monetary-sanction-for-corrupt-practices-13233/ [http://perma.cc/R3WCW4KR].
36. Liam Moloney, Milan Court Finds Saipem Guilty of Nigeria Corruption, WALL
STREET J. (July 11, 2013, 3:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873
24425204578599990427813164 [http://perma.cc/YBD5-Z7Z5].
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including Nigeria, on behalf of customers.37 The Panalpina defendants paid
over $230 million in penalties and disgorgement.38 Subsequently, in early
2011, several of the companies charged in the United States reportedly paid
an additional $18.8 million to settle charges brought by the Nigerian EFCC
and Attorney General’s Office based on the alleged bribery of the Nigerian
officials.39
Insofar as the multiple settlements in the Bonny Island and Panalpina
cases reportedly premised liability on the same bribes paid to the same
officials in connection with the same contracts, they represent true “carbon
copy” prosecutions. Publicly available information does not suggest to
what extent, if any, the penalties imposed in one jurisdiction played a role
in the calculation of penalties imposed by other authorities.
These two sets of cases thus highlight fundamental issues that can arise
when an inherently multinational crime, such as foreign bribery, is subject
to independent enforcement by multiple sovereigns. Namely, the cases
illustrate the issues of (1) how to weigh the law enforcement interests of the
various involved states against one another, and (2) how to address the
inherent unfairness and unpredictability of a system that contains no check
on the imposition of multiple penalties in successive enforcement actions,
by different authorities, for the same conduct. Which and whose interests
should predominate in any given case? Should authorities in demand-side
countries ever defer to investigations and penalties collected by supply-side
jurisdictions or jurisdictions with only a tenuous link to the conduct in
question? Should countries like the United States defer to foreign bribery
investigations of non-U.S. companies conducted by the home jurisdiction or
the demand-side jurisdiction, even when penalties imposed by those
jurisdictions may not be viewed as sufficient to deter future misconduct or
to disgorge ill-gotten gains?
Not all “carbon copy” prosecutions are brought by demand-side countries
seeking to take advantage of investigations conducted by resource-rich
authorities abroad. There have been a number of cases brought by U.S.
enforcement authorities following settlements by companies with foreign
governments for related conduct. In nearly all of these cases, however, U.S.
authorities reportedly accounted for penalties paid to (or, in some cases,
anticipated to be paid to) foreign enforcement authorities by the defendantcompany when calculating monetary sanctions under settlement or plea
agreements.
37. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight
Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More
than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/oilservices-companies-and-freight-forwarding-company-agree-resolve-foreign-bribery
[http://perma.cc/3RLB-AJYJ].
38. Id. The companies agreed to pay a total of approximately $156.6 million in criminal
penalties. Id. In SEC actions, they paid civil disgorgement, interest, and penalties totaling
approximately $80 million. Id.
39. Noble Corp. said it would pay $2.5 million; Royal Dutch Shell, $10 million; and
Tidewater, $6.3 million. See Trace Compendium, supra note 10 (search entries for “Noble
Corporation,” “Royal Dutch Shell,” and “Tidewater”).
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For example, in 2014, the DOJ and SEC settled allegations that
executives at ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O. (“HP Russia”) created a secret
slush fund to bribe Russian government officials.40 In its plea agreement
with HP Russia, the DOJ identified that an anticipated payment in
connection with an ongoing related proceeding in Germany, as well as
payments by HP Russia’s parent company (Hewlett-Packard, Inc.) to the
SEC, were among the factors justifying a downward departure from the
While the $58.8 million penalty was
recommended fine range.41
significantly less than the $87 million to $174 million fine range suggested
by the DOJ’s calculation, the DOJ’s papers did not specify how the “credit”
for these other penalties was determined or how it was apportioned between
the German and SEC proceedings.42
In 2013, Alfred C. Toepfer International (Ukraine) Ltd. (“ADM
Ukraine”), a subsidiary of Archer-Daniels-Midland Company, pleaded
guilty to violating the FCPA by paying bribes to Ukrainian government
officials to obtain tax refunds.43 According to the plea agreement with the
DOJ, ADM Ukraine received a deduction of $1,338,387 to account for a
fine imposed by German authorities on ADM Ukraine’s direct parent
company, Alfred C. Toepfer International GmbH, for the same conduct.44
In a parallel action, ADM consented with the SEC to a proposed final
judgment that required the company to pay roughly $36.5 million in
disgorgement and prejudgment interest, without adjusting for the fine
imposed by German authorities.45
In 2011, Aon Corporation, a publicly traded Delaware company, entered
into a nonprosecution agreement (NPA) with the DOJ. The company paid a
40. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Hewlett-Packard Russia Agrees to Plead
Guilty to Foreign Bribery (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hewlett-packardrussia-agrees-plead-guilty-foreign-bribery [http://perma.cc/6XTQ-9AU3]; Press Release,
SEC, SEC Charges Hewlett-Packard with FCPA Violations (Apr. 9, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370541453075#.VPcRtflWqV
A [http://perma.cc/PHM7-U2CU].
41. Plea Agreement at 16, United States v. Zao Hewlett-Packard A.O., No. CR-14-201
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/hewlett-packardzao/hp-russia-plea-agreement.pdf [http://perma.cc/2SXC-DS59]. The SEC likewise applied
a credit against its SEC disgorgement figure in its settled administrative proceeding against
Hewlett-Packard for an administrative forfeiture undertaken by the DOJ in connection with
the criminal resolution by Hewlett-Packard’s Mexican subsidiary. See Cease-and-Desist
Order, In re Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 71916 (SEC Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/admin/2014/34-71916.pdf [http://perma.cc/K9TU-LW3R].
42. See SEC, supra note 40.
43. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ADM Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to
Conspiracy to Violate the FCPA (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/admsubsidiary-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-violate-foreign-corrupt-practices-act [http://perma.cc/
T4VC-LAMP].
44. See Plea Agreement at 8, United States v. Alfred Toeffer Int’l (Ukraine) Ltd., No.
13-cr-20062 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/1082/doc/
Docs_9_and_9-1_Plea_and_Exhibit%28s%29_13-cr-20062_%2812-20-13%29.pdf [http://
perma.cc/FCP3-VA2G].
45. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Archer-Daniels-Midland Company with FCPA
Violations (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/
1370540535139#.UrS_GPY2byA [http://perma.cc/5TGT-K68R].
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$1.76 million fine to resolve FCPA charges for alleged improper payments
by Aon’s U.K. subsidiary, Aon Limited, to Costa Rican officials.46 The
NPA cited a previous fine of £5.25 million paid by an Aon subsidiary to the
United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority47 (FSA) covering conduct
in Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Indonesia, Myanmar, the United Arab Emirates,
and Vietnam in 2009, and “the FSA’s close and continuous supervisory
oversight over Aon Limited,” as factors informing the financial penalty and
the DOJ’s decision not to prosecute.48 But publicly available information
still left somewhat unclear exactly how the U.K. and U.S. authorities’
separate—though apparently coordinated—penalties corresponded to which
conduct in which geographic areas.49
In 2010, French telecommunications company Alcatel-Lucent S.A.
(“Alcatel-Lucent”) and three of its subsidiaries entered into a deferred
prosecution agreement (DPA) and other related agreements with the DOJ
and paid a total of $92 million in criminal penalties and approximately
$45.4 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to the SEC to settle
a U.S. investigation into alleged illicit payments in Costa Rica, Honduras,
Malaysia, and Taiwan.50 The DPA indicated that the fine imposed was
appropriate given, among other things, “penalties related to the same
conduct in Costa Rica,” referencing $10 million paid by Alcatel-Lucent
earlier that year to settle civil claims in a corruption case brought by Costa
Rican authorities.51 Again, it is unclear how the $10 million was factored
into the overall DOJ penalty, which fell within the $86.5 to $173.2 million

46. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Aon Corporation Agrees to Pay a $1.76 Million
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Violations of the FCPA (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/aon-corporation-agrees-pay-176-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-violations-foreigncorrupt [http://perma.cc/HW2Q-Z5ZM].
47. The FSA has since been restructured and replaced by the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA) as the primary financial regulatory body in the United Kingdom. History of
the FCA, FCA (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.fca.org.uk/about/history [http://perma.cc/PT7EPY5W].
48. Memorandum from the U.S. Dep’t of Justice to Lauren A. Urgenson, Esq. 1 (Dec.
20,
2011),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/aon/2011-12-20-aon-finalexecuted-npa.pdf [http://perma.cc/V5YA-TGKS].
49. See id.
50. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries
Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Dec. 27,
2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alcatel-lucent-sa-and-three-subsidiaries-agree-pay-92million-resolve-foreign-corrupt [http://perma.cc/DRS5-UGWG].
Alcatel-Lucent was
charged with one count of violating the internal control provisions of the FCPA and one
count of violating the books and records provisions of the FCPA. Id. Alcatel-Lucent agreed
to resolve the charges by entering into a DPA for a term of three years. Id. The DOJ also
filed criminal informations charging three subsidiaries—Alcatel-Lucent France S.A.,
Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G., and Alcatel Centroamerica S.A.—with conspiring
to violate the antibribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA.
Id. Each of the three subsidiaries agreed to plead guilty to the charges. Id. The $92 million
penalty was imposed pursuant to the DPA with the parent company. See Deferred
Prosecution Agreement at 7, United States v. Alcatel-Lucent, No. 10-cr-20907 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 22, 2011).
51. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 50, at 7.
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fine range calculated by the government.52 The $10 million fine was not
expressly taken into consideration in the SEC matter.53
In 2004, Norwegian authorities issued penalty notices to Statoil ASA
(“Statoil”) for approximately $3 million for trading-in-influence violations
(a lesser charge than foreign bribery, with milder penalties under
Norwegian law).54 Concurrent with the Norwegian investigation, the DOJ
and SEC opened investigations into Statoil for violations of the FCPA.
Statoil settled with both agencies in 2006.55 In light of the fine paid to
Norwegian authorities, the DOJ reduced the ordered penalty of $10.5
million by $3 million.56 The SEC required Statoil to pay disgorgement of
$10.5 million, not adjusted to reflect the Norwegian penalties.57
This “offsetting” approach somewhat reduces the problem of duplicative
penalties, although in many cases it is unclear how the offset is calculated
or what conduct is considered relevant. This approach also arguably
alleviates concerns about protecting the interests of the demand-side
country.58 It still leaves open, however, the question of whether a single
investigation and resolution—by one authority, or jointly with multiple
authorities—would better promote the goals of anticorruption legislation
and fairness to the investigated companies, particularly where those
companies are cooperating with the relevant authorities.
C. Other “Me Too” Prosecutions
As a practical matter, the enforcement picture is even more complex than
these examples suggest. Although it is certainly possible that the country
where a bribe occurred and the country where the offenders reside will both
look to exercise jurisdiction over a single matter, sometimes a single
instance of bribery prosecuted by one country will become “the entry point
to a much larger complex of corruption-related offenses, typically spanning
an extended period of time and affecting multiple jurisdictions.”59 In that
case, multiple prosecutions by different enforcement authorities may target
52. Id.
53. Litigation Release No. 21795, SEC, SEC Files Settled Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Charges Against Alcatel-Lucent, S.A. with Total Disgorgement and Criminal Fines of Over
$137 Million (Dec. 27, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21795.htm
[http://perma.cc/RNS7-683J].
54. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6, United States v. Statoil, ASA (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
10, 2006).
55. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil Company
That Bribed Iranian Official (Oct. 13, 2006), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/
2006/October/06_crm_700.html [http://perma.cc/G373-SAX3].
56. See id.; Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 54, at 14–15.
57. Cease-and-Desist Order, In re Statoil, ASA, No. 54599 (SEC Oct. 13, 2006). The
SEC presumably would argue that the lack of a civil penalty was the “credit” for penalties
paid to the DOJ and/or Norwegian authorities, and the disgorgement is simply the return of
ill-gotten profits. The reality, however, is that the company ultimately paid for the same
conduct to three different authorities.
58. See supra Part I.A.
59. JACINTA ANYANGO ODUOR ET AL., LEFT OUT OF THE BARGAIN: SETTLEMENTS IN
FOREIGN BRIBERY CASES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSET RECOVERY 60 (2014).
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aspects of a bribery scheme in different places or at different times.60 Thus,
the different prosecutions may be related and may overlap to a degree, but
may not all punish the same alleged misconduct.
One example of this phenomenon is the investigation of Siemens AG
(“Siemens”), which settled with both U.S. and German authorities in
2008.61 Pursuant to the U.S. settlement, Siemens and three of its
subsidiaries paid a total of $800 million to resolve allegations with the DOJ
and SEC ($450 million in criminal fines to the DOJ62 and $350 million in
disgorgement to the SEC).63 The conduct generally arose out of illegal
payments made in Latin America, the Middle East, and Bangladesh.64
Siemens paid approximately $569 million more to settle charges with the
Munich Prosecutor’s office.65 The German charges involved a different set
of corrupt acts in the medical and transportation sectors in Spain,
Venezuela, and China.66
Over the five years following the U.S. and German settlements, Siemens
also resolved actions with a number of authorities in other countries,
including: (1) a $100 million settlement with the World Bank to resolve
fraud allegations against a Russian affiliate of Siemens;67 (2) a $46.5
million settlement with the Nigerian EFCC related to criminal charges
against Siemens and its subsidiary, Siemens Ltd. Nigeria;68 (3) a €270
million settlement with Greece to resolve multiple civil and criminal
complaints involving bribery in the Greek telecommunications market;69
and (4) orders by the Swiss Federal Prosecutor’s Office to forfeit $65
million of “dirty money” related to the slush fund scandal and $10.6 million
in profits obtained by Siemens’ Swedish subsidiary after channeling bribe
money through Swiss accounts to win orders from a Russian gas pipeline
project.70
60. Id.
61. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead
Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in
Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/
December/08-crm-1105.html [http://perma.cc/7MSF-XCLX].
62. Id. Siemens AG agreed to pay a $448.5 million fine, and Siemens Argentina,
Bangladesh, and Venezuela each agreed to pay a $500,000 fine. Id.
63. Id.; Eric Lichtblau & Carter Dougherty, Siemens to Pay $1.34 Billion in Fines, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/16/business/worldbusiness/
16siemens.html [http://perma.cc/5U8B-P2UZ].
64. ODUOR ET AL., supra note 59, at 132 & n.219.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 133.
68. See Trace Compendium, supra note 10 (search entry for “Siemens AG”).
69. See ODOUR ET AL., supra note 59, at 133–34.
70. Matthew Allen, Swiss Seize CHF60 Million Corporate Bribes, SWISSINFO.CH (Nov.
12, 2013), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/slush-funds_swiss-seize-chf60-million-corporatebribes/37317030 [http://perma.cc/CLT3-8XV4]. Furthermore, prior to the headline-making
settlements with U.S. and German authorities, Siemens and a subsidiary had entered into a
plea bargain in Milan, agreeing to pay a €0.5 million fine and to give up €6.1 million of
profit relating to contracts procured as a result of bribes paid by its executives to officials at
state-owned Enelpower. ODOUR ET AL., supra note 59, at 132. Also, in 2007, Siemens
entered into a separate agreement with the Munich prosecutor’s office for $287 million to
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In another, more recent example, the United States brought a follow-on
prosecution of Alstom S.A. (“Alstom”), a French power and transportation
company, and its Swiss subsidiary, Alstom Network Schweiz AG71
(“Alstom Network”). In 2011, Alstom Network was subject to a summary
punishment order issued by the Swiss Office of the Attorney General for
failing to prevent the payment of bribes to foreign public officials in Latvia,
Malaysia, and Tunisia.72 Under that order, Alstom was sentenced to a fine
of 2.5 million Swiss francs and a compensatory penalty of 36.4 million
Swiss francs.73 In addition, in 2012, Alstom Network and another Alstom
subsidiary, Alstom Hydro France, were debarred for three years under a
negotiated resolution agreement with the World Bank, pursuant to which
the companies acknowledged making an improper payment of €110,000 to
an entity controlled by a former Zambian senior government official for
consultancy services in relation to a World Bank project.74 That agreement
also included a restitution payment by the two companies totaling
approximately $9.5 million.75
In connection with the related prosecution brought by U.S. authorities, in
2014, Alstom and Alstom Network pleaded guilty and agreed to pay a
record $772 million criminal fine to resolve charges related to a widespread
scheme involving bribes paid to government officials in connection with
power and transportation projects for state-owned entities in Indonesia,
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Bahamas, and Taiwan.76 Alstom Grid Inc. and
Alstom Power Inc., two U.S. subsidiaries, both entered into DPAs,
admitting to charges that they conspired to violate the antibribery
provisions of the FCPA.77
The Siemens and Alstom cases both made headlines (and incurred
record-breaking penalties) because of the scale, scope, and geographic
reach of the wrongdoing uncovered by various enforcement authorities.
Notably, while these cases provide examples of how several different
enforcement authorities can conduct multiple, related bribery prosecutions,
the various prosecutions of Siemens and Alstom appear to cover
misconduct in different areas of the world, with little apparent overlap.78
Without insight into the confidential negotiations behind these settlements,
it is impossible to know in which instances, if any, various authorities took
into consideration potential prosecutions or ongoing investigations in other
jurisdictions, or in what cases an investigation by one authority may have
settle similar claims relating to corrupt payments to foreign officials by Siemens AG’s
Telecommunications. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 61.
71. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alstom Pleads Guilty and Agrees to Pay $772
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Charges (Dec. 22, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alstom-pleads-guilty-and-agrees-pay-772-million-criminalpenalty-resolve-foreign-bribery [http://perma.cc/Z5ET-SM5V].
72. ODUOR ET AL., supra note 59, at 105.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 107.
75. Id.
76. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 71.
77. Id.
78. See id.; see also ODUOR ET AL., supra note 59, at 105–07, 131–34.
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spurred investigations by others that uncovered new, chargeable offenses.
It also is unclear whether the selection of specific conduct by each
prosecuting authority had any relation to that conduct’s relevance to, or
impact on, each prosecuting authority’s national interests, or whether the
division was based on horse trading (or simply happenstance).
From the perspective of promoting efficient and just responses to
corruption, the specter of global companies facing successive enforcement
actions in response to separate offenses that occurred in different
jurisdictions does not raise the same fairness concerns as true “carbon
copy” prosecutions. The Siemens and Alstom cases certainly prompt
questions, however, about what companies can or should do to limit their
anticorruption liability risks once certain corrupt conduct has been
discovered. These cases also raise questions about the limits of what
enforcement authorities can do to facilitate predictability and efficiency in a
multijurisdictional enforcement context.
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO MULTIJURISDICTIONAL ENFORCEMENT
As more countries demonstrate an aggressive willingness to pursue
corruption cases, the possibility that multinational companies could face
successive prosecutions and/or concurrent liability is an increasingly
worrisome prospect. To date, however, global authorities have largely
managed to sidestep the problem of duplicative penalties by using one of
several related mechanisms: penalty offsets, coordinated settlements, or
declinations. This part explores how enforcement authorities have used
these mechanisms to address overlapping jurisdiction. While some of these
solutions indeed mitigate concerns about unfair penalties, they do not go the
distance in terms of providing a clear set of principles to avoid unfairness,
duplicative investigations, and other negative impacts of multijurisdictional
enforcement.
A. Offsetting Monetary Penalties
As noted above, the DOJ (and to a lesser extent the SEC) has
demonstrated a willingness to give “credit” to companies for monetary
penalties paid to foreign enforcement authorities for the same or similar
conduct.79 What is more, in several cases, U.S. authorities appear to have
directed their investigation and charges to illegal acts and actors not
encompassed by the earlier settlements. In the HP Russia matter, for
example, the U.S. authorities charged a different entity than was under
investigation by Germany,80 and in the Aon matter, the alleged bribes were
paid in countries that were not a part of the FSA resolution.81 Arguably, in
these matters, the defendants were credited for penalties based on
misconduct that was related to—but separate from—misconduct that was
charged by U.S. authorities.
79. See supra notes 40–56 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 40–56 and accompanying text.
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The “offsetting” approach to successive enforcement actions partially
remedies the potential unfairness to defendants of multiple penalties. An
example of the use of “offsets” is the Alcatel-Lucent matter, discussed
above, in which the United States, which had an attenuated interest in a
bribery scheme by non-U.S. companies operating internationally, partially
offset criminal penalties by the amount of a monetary sanction paid to
Costa Rica, a country with a more direct interest in that scheme.82 This
offsetting approach shows the practical difficulty of determining the right
amount to offset. The TSKJ and Panalpina matters are also good
examples.83 After U.S. authorities imposed substantial penalties in those
cases, it is difficult to know how much credit, if any, the companies
received in the subsequent Nigerian proceedings (and whether any credit
was appropriate at all). By utilizing an offsetting approach, Nigeria—
arguably the “victim” country—may have had no incentive to enforce its
antibribery laws against any of these defendants.
Even in cases where the timing and coordination is such that offsetting
can be used effectively, crediting penalties paid in parallel proceedings only
ameliorates the problem of duplicative penalties and proceedings. It does
nothing to reduce the burdens and costs associated with responding to serial
investigations by different foreign and domestic regulators for the same
offenses.
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that one enforcement authority will
reduce the penalties it imposes in acknowledgement of monetary or other
penalties paid to other foreign enforcement authorities. For example, in its
2014 settlement with Alstom, the DOJ did not appear to credit penalties
paid in the related Swiss and World Bank enforcement actions and, in fact,
noted these settlements as evidence of Alstom’s repeated wrongdoing.84
Arguably the Swiss and World Bank settlements addressed conduct that
was not covered by the FCPA charges, but this has not always prevented
the DOJ from crediting foreign sanctions in the past.85 Alstom’s reported
lack of cooperation and failure to self-disclose its misconduct may have
played a role in the decision by U.S. authorities not to credit those earlier
sanctions.86 But without more visibility into the U.S. settlement process, or
additional guidance from U.S. regulators, it is difficult to infer anything

82. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
83. See supra Part I.B.
84. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 71. The JGC and Siemens cases are other
examples. The United States may have declined to credit JGC’s settlement with Nigeria to
maintain consistency with its treatment of other TSKJ consortium members, which were
subject to Nigerian penalties only after settling with U.S. authorities. See supra Part I.B. In
the Siemens cases, the bribes at issue in earlier actions by foreign prosecutions were not
within the scope of the conduct charged by the United States. See supra Part I.C.
85. See Plea Agreement at 14, United States v. Alstom S.A., No. 14-CR-236 (D. Conn.
Dec. 22, 2014).
86. Cf. id.
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certain about the SEC’s or DOJ’s policies with respect to U.S. treatment of
foreign antibribery settlements.87
B. Coordinated Actions
A second approach that authorities with overlapping jurisdiction have
used in past enforcement actions is to reach a “global” or simultaneous
settlement with the offending company. In these cases, various regulators
appear to have coordinated their penalties (and presumably their
investigations) by focusing either on the conduct of different corporate
entities or on different geographic areas. The U.S./German actions against
Siemens, discussed above, are one example of this approach.88 Others are
discussed below.
In May 2013, Total S.A. (“Total”) settled FCPA charges related to illegal
payments made through third parties to an Iranian government official to
obtain oil and gas concessions.89 That same day, French authorities
announced that Total and its chief executive officer, among others, would
also face prosecution in connection with alleged bribes and kickback
payments made to Iraqi officials in connection with the Oil-for-Food
Program.90
In 2011, Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay a $21.4 million penalty to
resolve criminal FCPA charges against its subsidiary, DePuy Inc., and
$48.6 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to settle related
civil charges.91 Following a referral from the United States, the SFO
brought charges against DePuy International Limited, the U.K.-based
subsidiary of DePuy Inc.92 On the day the U.S. penalty was announced, the
SFO announced that DePuy International Limited had been ordered to pay
£4.8 million in a civil recovery action.93 The DOJ and SEC both stated in
press releases that they reduced Johnson & Johnson’s financial penalties in

87. It bears noting that the DOJ did defer to the World Bank’s investigation insofar as it
already led to the appointment of a corporate monitor by not requiring a second monitor if
the company complied with its World Bank settlement monitoring.
88. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
89. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, French Oil & Gas Company, Total, S.A.,
Charged in the United States and France in Connection with an International Bribery
Scheme (May 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/french-oil-and-gas-company-totalsa-charged-united-states-and-france-connection-international [http://perma.cc/V8J4-ZE5C].
90. Id.; Associated Press, Total and French Officials Cleared in Iraq Oil-for-Food Case,
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/business/global/total-andfrench-officials-cleared-in-iraq-oil-for-food-case.html [http://perma.cc/BD8D-LE6F].
91. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Johnson & Johnson Agrees to Pay $21.4
Million Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Oil for Food
Investigations (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/johnson-johnson-agrees-pay214-million-criminal-penalty-resolve-foreign-corrupt-practices-act [http://perma.cc/NX8DBUQQ].
92. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, DePuy International Ltd. Ordered to Pay
£4.829 Million in Civil Recovery Order (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.sfo.gov.uk/pressroom/press-release-archive/press-releases-2011/depuy-international-limited-ordered-to-pay4829-million-in-civil-recovery-order.aspx [http://perma.cc/Q84J-QKN2].
93. Id.
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light of the company’s civil penalties in the United Kingdom, although they
did not say whether the reduction matched the initial penalty.94
In 2010, although never charged with FCPA liability, BAE entered into
coordinated settlements with U.S. and U.K. authorities in connection with
suspicious payments made in several countries.95 In the U.S. actions, BAE
pleaded guilty to charges arising out of payments to secure business in the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Iraq, and paid a fine of $400 million.96 That
same day, the SFO ordered BAE to make a $47.7 million payment for the
benefit of the people of Tanzania, the country adversely affected by BAE’s
alleged payments to an “advisor” there.97 The publicly released papers did
not say how, if at all, the penalties in one jurisdiction were accounted for by
the other jurisdiction.98
Also in 2010, the United Kingdom and the United States pursued
criminal cases against Innospec Inc., a Delaware company, and its British
subsidiary, Innospec Ltd.99 The United States prosecuted Innospec Inc. for
conspiracy, foreign bribery, and books and records violations relating to
conduct in Iraq; the SFO prosecuted Innospec Ltd. for foreign bribery with
respect to Indonesia.100 Once again, the SFO’s case was developed as a
result of a referral by the DOJ, and both settlements were announced on the
same day.101 The U.S. plea agreement notes that Innospec represented that
“its total ability to pay all enforcement agencies” was $40.2 million and,
“[i]n light of the interests of the other enforcement agencies,” $14.1 million
would be paid to the DOJ, $11.2 million to the SEC, $12.7 million to the

94. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 91.
95. Boutros & Funk, supra note 25, at 290–91.
96. WILMERHALE LLP, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT BRIEFING SERIES: ANTICORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT DEVELOPMENTS: 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW AND 2011 PREVIEW 2
(2011),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/WilmerHale_Shared_Content/Files/
Editorial/Publication/Anti-Corruption%20Enforcement%20Developments.pdf [http://perma.
cc/Z7DQ-F7QM].
97. See Mike Koehler, A Conversation with Richard Alderman Regarding BAE, SCRIBD
(Feb. 23, 2011), www.scribd.com/doc/50759481/A-Conversation-With-Richard-AldermanRegarding-BAE [http://perma.cc/FNX2-TECE].
98. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, BAE Systems PLC Pleads Guilty and
Ordered to Pay $400 Million Criminal Fine (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/bae-systems-plc-pleads-guilty-and-ordered-pay-400-million-criminal-fine
[http://
perma.cc/49HU-HXKH]; see also Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, BAE Fined in
Tanzania Defence Contract Case (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/pressrelease-archive/press-releases-2010/bae-fined-in-tanzania-defence-contract-case.aspx [http://
perma.cc/UN8D-8MZP].
99. Plea Offer at 4, United States v. Innospec Inc., No. 1:10-cr-00061 (D.D.C. Mar. 18,
2010),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/2011/02/16/03-1810innospec-plea.pdf [http://perma.cc/3B9N-RR42].
100. Id. ¶ 2; Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Innospec Limited Prosecuted for
Corruption by the SFO (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/press-releasearchive/press-releases-2010/innospec-limited-prosecuted-for-corruption-by-the-sfo.aspx
[http://perma.cc/9Q86-K36V].
101. RICHARD ALDERMAN, B20 TASK FORCE ON IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY AND ANTICORRUPTION: DEVELOPMENT OF A PRELIMINARY STUDY ON POSSIBLE REGULATORY
DEVELOPMENTS TO ENHANCE THE PRIVATE SECTOR ROLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION
IN A GLOBAL BUSINESS CONTEXT 17–18 (2014).
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SFO, and $2.2 million to the Office of Foreign Assets Control.102 It did not
explain how those amounts had been determined.
While coordinated resolutions are certainly a step in the right direction,
there are still many shortcomings with this approach as it is currently
applied. It is unclear how U.S. and foreign authorities resolve differing
views of the facts or law, or how they decide who takes the lead on an
investigation. It also is unclear what a company can do to promote a
coordinated resolution. There is little transparency with respect to the
circumstances under which various regulators have sought to coordinate
their efforts to achieve a single resolution.103 In some cases, coordinated
settlements may be the outcome of a referral of the matter from one
authority to another; they may be the product of self-reporting to multiple
authorities and voluntary intergovernmental cooperation;104 they may arise
where one government lacks jurisdiction over an aspect of a transnational
bribery scheme; or they may be the result of some combination of these
factors.105 On a more practical level, the coordination and division of
penalties may be a result of horse trading or comity as multiple regulators
that have invested significant resources into the investigation seek to obtain
something to show for it.
Although U.S. enforcement authorities have expressed commitment to
cooperation with international counterparts, past cooperation is no indicator
of future cooperation. For example, while the DOJ acknowledged
cooperation by French investigative authorities in the Total case, the
Alstom press release makes no reference to assistance from French law
enforcement, despite the fact that Alstom is a major French company.106
Moreover, while U.S. and U.K. authorities have cooperated in a number of
recent cases, the SFO has charged two Alstom entities and a number of
individuals independently of the U.S. settlement.107
Moreover, cooperation and coordination between multiple authorities
may not ultimately be tantamount to a single resolution.108 Unless the
coordinated settlement includes all potentially interested sovereigns, there
always is the possibility that additional countries will bring future charges
based on the same conduct. Indeed, where each state takes jurisdiction over
different violations, it is possible that the “coordinating” parties will later
bring related charges following a settlement.109 Recently, for example,
Total disclosed that it will face trial in France on corruption charges related
to payments in Iran, potentially implicating in its first “coordinated” action
102. Plea Offer, supra note 99, at 4.
103. See, e.g., Alderman, supra note 101, at 31 n.46.
104. See Boutros & Funk, supra note 25, at 287–89.
105. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., supra note 6, at 15.
106. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 71.
107. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Former Alstom Director Faces UK Corruption
Charges (May 12, 2015), http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/pressreleases-2015/former-alstom-director-faces-uk-corruption-charges.aspx
[http://perma.cc/
53DS-HFZ8].
108. See ODOUR ET AL., supra note 59, at 45, 62.
109. See supra Part I.B.
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with French authorities the precise acts the company acknowledged in its
agreement with the DOJ.110
In the Innospec matter, to take another example, it may be that U.S. and
U.K. authorities did not discuss offsetting or otherwise recognize penalties
from other jurisdictions because the conduct encompassed in each matter
was different.111 That said, had just one jurisdiction’s enforcement
authorities pursued all the conduct, it is likely that the total penalty to
Innospec would have been lower. Moreover, it is unclear why the United
States reasonably had any more interest in the Iraqi conduct or why the
United Kingdom had any more interest in the Indonesian conduct. The
level of coordination visible to the public would appear to suggest that
major aspects of the settlement were largely a matter of practical
accommodations between the jurisdictions, rather than any principled
apportionment of proper enforcement authority and scope of sanctioning.112
C. Declinations
A final approach that enforcement authorities have taken to the matter of
overlapping jurisdiction is to decline to prosecute a company for a violation
on the grounds that the company has already resolved charges brought by
authorities of a different country for the same or similar offenses. This
practice has been applied in a small number of multijurisdictional cases so
far.
On June 15, 2015, the DOJ announced that the former CEO of PetroTiger
Ltd. pleaded guilty to conspiring to bribe Colombian officials in the employ
of Ecopetrol, the state-owned oil company.113 Three other former
PetroTiger executives had already pleaded guilty, but the DOJ declined to
prosecute the company itself, citing voluntary disclosure, cooperation, and
remediation.114 The DOJ acknowledged the assistance of the Philippines,
Panama, and the United Kingdom, in addition to several agencies of the
Colombian government, but there has been no suggestion that the DOJ’s
declination relates to any contemplated actions by these countries.115
More recently, and perhaps more interestingly, the DOJ dropped its
investigation of Dutch-based SBM Offshore after the company entered into
110. Tara Patel, Total Faces French Trial on Iran-Corruption Claim After U.S. Deal,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 26, 2014, 9:59 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-1126/total-faces-french-trial-on-iran-corruption-claim-after-u-s-deal
[http://perma.cc/D5823E5Q].
111. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Innospec Inc. Pleads Guilty to FCPA
Charges and Defrauding the United Nations; Admits to Violating the U.S. Embargo Against
Cuba (Mar. 18, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/innospec-inc-pleads-guilty-fcpacharges-and-defrauding-united-nations-admits-violating-us [http://perma.cc/RX6M-PTBR];
Serious Fraud Office, supra note 100.
112. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 111.
113. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Chief Executive Officer of Oil Services
Company Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charge (June 15, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/former-chief-executive-officer-oil-services-company-pleads-guilty-foreign-briberycharge [http://perma.cc/KFW7-GCMN].
114. Id.
115. Id.
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a $240 million out-of-court settlement with the Dutch Public Prosecutor for
antibribery violations in Equatorial Guinea, Angola, and Brazil.116 The
settlement amount consisted of a $40 million fine and $200 million in
disgorgement.117 It is tempting to assume that the record size of the Dutch
penalty would have negated any U.S. penalties under the “offset” approach
sometimes applied. That said, it also is possible that the DOJ “declined”
the case because it did not have jurisdiction or faced evidentiary hurdles.
In 2007, Sweden’s National Corruption Unit launched an investigation
into AB Volvo based on kickbacks the company’s subsidiaries paid to Iraqi
officials in connection with the U.N. Oil-for-Food program—conduct that
was also charged by the SEC and DOJ in 2008.118 Although two executives
were found guilty of bribery in 2012, the Swedish prosecutor reportedly
declined to demand a corporate fine because of Volvo’s payment of $19.6
million in penalties in the United States.119
Unfortunately, because regulators rarely disclose the rationale behind
their decisions to forgo prosecution, there is very little basis from which to
draw conclusions about the circumstances under which one sovereign will
defer to another in the pursuit of corruption charges. Moreover, there may
be instances where an authority forgoes opening an investigation altogether
because an investigation is already ongoing in another jurisdiction. Absent
public comment or other guidance from the relevant enforcement
authorities, we can only speculate as to the considerations underlying these
decisions. Although declinations avoid the problem of double jeopardy,
there is still a lack of clarity and predictability around the question of when
authorities will deliver and on what grounds.
Several recent actions by foreign authorities may soon shed light on this
issue. As discussed above, Petrobras and GSK have been involved in
corruption scandals in Brazil and China, respectively.120 GSK paid $489
million to settle charges in China that involved alleged physician kickbacks,
among other things, and the company is reportedly now under investigation
by U.S. and U.K. authorities for possible antibribery violations.121
Similarly, Brazilian federal prosecutors have purportedly sought $1.55
billion from six construction and engineering companies for their alleged
116. Nicolas Torres, SBM Offshore Pays $240 Million to Resolve Dutch Bribe
Allegations, Receives DOJ Declination, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 12, 2014, 11:22 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/11/12/sbm-offshore-pays-240-million-to-resolve-dutchbribe-allegat.html [http://perma.cc/L43X-ZDVN].
117. Press Release, Openbaar Ministerie, SBM Offshore N.V. Settles Bribery Case for
US$ 240,000,000 (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.om.nl/actueel/nieuwsberichten/@87201/
sbm-offshore-settles/ [http://perma.cc/Y7WK-4M7D].
118. Richard L. Cassin, AB Volvo Settles FCPA Charges for $19.6 Million, FCPA BLOG
(Mar. 20, 2008, 12:39 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2008/3/20/ab-volvo-settles-fcpacharges-for-196-million.html [http://perma.cc/8ZAS-GANB].
119. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, AB Volvo to Pay $7 Million Penalty for
Kickback Payments to the Iraqi Government Under the U.N. Oil for Food Program (Mar. 8,
2008), http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/March/08_crm_220.html [http://perma.cc
/44DK-JC7N].
120. See supra INTRODUCTION.
121. Plumridge & Burkitt, supra note 12.
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involvement in a kickback scheme at Petrobras.122 The DOJ and SEC are
now both reportedly investigating the Petrobras matter.123 The fact that
U.S. authorities are conducting follow-on and/or parallel investigations in
these cases suggests that they may not be willing to back down solely on
the basis of a strong response by a foreign enforcer. It remains to be seen
how U.S. authorities will treat the issue of duplicative penalties in light of
the large amounts already sought or assessed by foreign governments.
Identifying patterns and trends in actions like these can be difficult, and
observers and practitioners may often be reduced to reading proverbial
tealeaves in an attempt to map out the landscape. Certainly, enforcers may
have a number of different reasons or motivations behind their decisions to
coordinate actions in any particular way. These decisions may reflect an
agreement or perception that the consequences already suffered may be
sufficient to punish or deter,124 or that a foreign authority has a stronger
interest in enforcement.125 Leniency may be based on a desire to avoid
unintended collateral consequences, such as undue harm to innocent
shareholders, employees, and other third parties.126 And, as illustrated in
several examples above, less principled and more practical considerations
may drive coordination (or “declination”) decisions in many cases.127
Companies engaged in international business may be hard pressed to
draw neat conclusions from such experiences in case studies that,
ultimately, provide too little consistency and predictability. Unable to fully
understand—much less control—how various authorities may synchronize
parallel actions and sanctions, companies have good reasons to prefer and
push for single coordinated “global” settlements. As it turns out, there are
122. See Trace Compendium, supra note 10 (entries for “Petroleo Brasileiro SA” and
“Embraer”).
123. See Update 2—Brazil’s Petrobras Says Received U.S. SEC Subpoena for
Documents, REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2014, 6:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/24/
brazil-petrobras-sec-idUSL2N0TE1UY20141124 [http://perma.cc/V8VA-5V7T].
124. For example, the DOJ’s NPA with Akzo Nobel was announced on the same day the
company agreed to pay nearly $3 million ($750,000 in civil penalties and $2.2 million in
disgorgement of profits) to the SEC, and it gave the company six months to enter into a
settlement with the Dutch National Public Prosecutor, or else pay an additional fine to the
U.S. Treasury. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Akzo Nobel Acknowledges
Improper Payments Made by Its Subsidiaries to Iraqi Government Under the U.N. Oil for
Food Program, Enters Agreement with Department of Justice (Dec. 20, 2007),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2007/December/07_crm_1024.html [http://perma.cc/
2ZCG-TN86]. Under circumstances such as these, the DOJ appears to be foregoing criminal
prosecution at least in part based on a reasoned judgment that a company has paid enough in
proportion to its wrongdoing, though certainly other factors could be at play. See id.
125. The reduced, discounted, or “offset” penalties accepted by the DOJ and SEC in
settlements with HP, ADM, Aon, Alcatel-Lucent, and Statoil (as discussed earlier) may all
reflect recognition by U.S. authorities that the various foreign enforcement agencies
involved in those cases had a stronger interest in regulating the conduct, had greater ability
or willingness to take the lead in enforcement, or at the very least got there first and had
things under control.
126. In the DOJ and SFO’s coordinated settlement with Innospec, for example, the
agencies’ cooperation in imposing fines was almost certainly influenced by the perception
that harsher penalties would likely have bankrupted the company.
127. See supra Part II.
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good policy reasons for national governments and the international
community to support single resolutions as well.
III. PRINCIPLED RESTRAINT IN A GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION REGIME:
POLICY REASONS FOR ENCOURAGING SINGLE RESOLUTIONS
As the previous part illustrates, multinational enforcement authorities
often voluntarily coordinate their actions in ways that are more or less
reasonable (as the case may be), but there are few reliable safeguards to
ensure that such discretion is exercised rationally, responsibly, and
regularly. Whenever parties reach multiple resolutions that impose multiple
rounds of sanctions on the same actors for the same conduct, there exists a
danger that those actors are being overly or unfairly punished and that law
enforcement resources are not being deployed efficiently.
Even though each jurisdiction in any given action may each have valid
reasons to seek its respective pound of flesh, duplicative enforcement
actions and multiple penalties may actually hinder the detection and
deterrence of corruption. Duplicative actions add an element of unfairness
and unpredictability to the enforcement regime.128 Thus, they also can be
counterproductive by discouraging parties from self-reporting and
cooperating with enforcement authorities.129 This part examines the ways
in which “carbon copy” and “me too” prosecutions can undermine the goals
of anticorruption legislation.
A. Overdeterrence and Fundamental Unfairness
Entirely duplicative enforcement actions and penalties seem to violate the
principle (or at least the spirit) of double jeopardy, the notion that repeat
prosecution is unlawful and that one defendant should not be tried twice for
the same crime.130 That principle is deeply ingrained, in some form at least,
in many legal systems throughout the world.131 It also is recognized by
international law. For example, the United Nations International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, to which the vast majority of states are party,
provides that “[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an

128. See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the
Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 45, 56–57 (2005).
129. See 1 ROGER M. WITTEN ET AL., COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT 7–8 (2013) (noting that companies self-report potential misconduct out of a sense that it
is in their own self-interest to do so).
130. See Erin M. Cranman, The Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy: A
Champion of Justice or a Violation of a Fundamental Right?, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1641,
1667–68 (2000).
131. See Peter Herbel et al., Double Jeopardy—Finding a Balance in Enforcement
Actions for Companies, LEGALWEEK.COM (Nov. 24, 2011), http://www.eldinternational.com/
wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Double-Jeopardy-Legal-Week-Nov-24-2011.pdf (noting that
double jeopardy principles are recognized by at least fifty countries and are incorporated into
numerous international treaties and conventions) [http://perma.cc/89T4-PGE4].
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offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in
accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country.”132
But the double jeopardy principle in the international context is highly
limited in application. It does not apply to international prosecutions by
different national enforcement authorities because of the dual sovereignty
doctrine exception, which provides that two sovereigns can prosecute an
individual for a single act that violates both countries’ laws.133 This
principle originates in the common law notion that a crime is an offense
against a sovereign, and, therefore, a single act that violates the laws of two
different countries constitutes two distinct offenses.134 As Justice Black has
noted, “If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two
‘Sovereigns’ to inflict it than for one . . . . In each case, inescapably, a man
is forced to face danger twice for the same conduct.”135 A company that
finds itself subject to an enforcement action in one country may spend years
in consecutive enforcement actions, unsure when the prosecution has truly
rested.136 This uncertainty is precisely what the double jeopardy protection
seeks to shield against.
The difficulties involved in raising a double jeopardy type of defense
were illustrated in a recent case involving the prosecution of an individual
in connection with the Siemens matter discussed earlier.137 The defendant
moved to dismiss the case brought against him in an Argentine court, on the
basis that he had already been prosecuted for the same conduct in Germany
(and ultimately reached a plea agreement with authorities there).138 But the
Argentine court refused to dismiss the case and allowed the prosecution to
proceed, on the basis that it “found no matching between the facts
investigated in Germany with those being investigated in Argentina, nor
between the private and public interests potentially at issue in each
country.”139 Thus, as conceived, the double jeopardy principle is narrow
enough that if courts and enforcement authorities can find some way to
distinguish the separate proceedings, and show they are not identical, it will
rarely be a bar to prosecution.
In addition to being fundamentally unfair, multiple duplicative
enforcement actions result in overdeterrence, penalizing companies more

132. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14(7), Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171.
133. Cranman, supra note 130, at 1655–56.
134. Id. at 1653.
135. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
136. Cranman, supra note 130, at 1667–68 (noting that an individual who commits a
crime involving multiple countries may spend years in a constant state of apprehension and
anxiety).
137. See supra Part I.C.
138. Lucio M. Fabani Larranga, Double Jeopardy? Siemens Defendant Loses Argentina
Dismissal Motion, FCPA BLOG (Jul. 21, 2015, 9:18 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/
2015/7/21/double-jeopardy-siemens-defendant-loses-argentina-dismissal.html [http://perma.
cc/8HVT-Q43P].
139. Id.
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harshly than is necessary to deter future misconduct.140 This is not only
unduly harsh, but it is also a waste of resources—a waste of enforcement
agencies’ resources in prosecuting misconduct that has already been
adjudicated and future instances of which have already been deterred, and a
waste of company resources in defending against another costly
enforcement action.141
When penalties are too high, companies will be induced to spend
excessive amounts to monitor employees in an attempt to avoid FCPA
violations.142 While prosecutors may question whether companies can ever
spend too much on compliance, these excessive costs may result in
increased costs of doing business, hindering the company’s ability to
provide competitive pricing.143 A company might decide that, despite a
robust compliance program, the risk of doing business in a particular
market is too high and might opt to pull its business out of that country
rather than risk successive enforcement actions and duplicative penalties.144
In fact, in recent cases, including the February 2015 settlement with
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, the SEC has touted divestiture of
foreign subsidiaries responsible for corrupt conduct as a “remedial effort”
reflected in the favorable settlement with the company.145 Similarly, in the
November 2010 settlement with Panalpina World Transport (Holding) Ltd.,
the DOJ acknowledged the company’s termination of its operations in one
of the countries in which misconduct had occurred as a factor in its
agreement to a fine below the guidelines range.146
B. The Chilling Effect of Duplicative Enforcement Actions
on Self-Reporting
A final reason to avoid duplicative enforcement is the chilling effect it
may have on self-reporting. Companies may be less likely to self-report
potential FCPA violations for fear of being subject to years of follow-on
investigations, carbon copy prosecutions, and disproportionately punitive
monetary sanctions for a single incident of bribery. A company may be
willing to take the risk that misconduct will remain undetected by law
enforcement and calculate that its resources are better spent on an internal
investigation to remedy the misconduct or on other business pursuits
unrelated to compliance.
140. See Dunahoe, supra note 128, at 56–57 (noting that sanctions for misconduct are
excessive if a less costly penalty exists that would have the same deterrent effect).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Goodyear with FCPA Violations (Feb. 24, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-38.html#.VPcxhPlWqVA
[http://perma.cc/
X69V-SXK4]; Cease-and-Desist Order, In re The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 74356,
(SEC Feb. 24, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-74356.pdf [http://perma.
cc/5QWZ-D8EG].
146. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7, United States v. Panalpina World Transport
(Holding) Ltd. (S.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/
legacy/2010/11/04/panalpina-world-transport-dpa.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y56F-9ZGU].
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The DOJ and SEC strongly encourage companies to self-report potential
FCPA violations.147 Both agencies identify voluntary disclosures of
wrongdoing as being a mitigating factor in determining what charges and
penalties are appropriate.148 Providing these incentives to self-report
potential misconduct allows the DOJ and SEC to focus their resources on
detecting corruption that goes unreported, allowing for a more efficient use
of law enforcement resources.149
Where disclosure is discretionary, companies weigh a number of factors
in determining whether it is in their best interest to self-report a potential
violation to the government. Companies self-report in the hopes that doing
so will result in a reduction in penalty and an efficient and definitive
resolution to the FCPA concern.150 However, the benefits of voluntary
disclosure are speculative and must be weighed against the many other
factors laid out by the DOJ and SEC as being relevant to enforcement
strategy.151 Add to this calculus the risk of costly follow-on investigations
and penalties from other jurisdictions (particularly those without established
track records in these investigations), and the perceived company benefits
of self-reporting may diminish even further.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSES: PRECEDENT AND PRESCRIPTION
There are international legal regimes that seek to bring consistency and
best practices to global anticorruption enforcement efforts, including those
put forward by the OECD Convention, the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption, and the World Bank.152 But as the cases discussed
147. RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 19, at 54 (“While the conduct underlying any FCPA
investigation is obviously a fundamental and threshold consideration in deciding what, if
any, action to take, both the DOJ and SEC place a high premium on self-reporting, along
with cooperation and remedial efforts, in determining the appropriate resolution of FCPA
matters.”).
148. See 5 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL ch. 9-28.700 (3d ed. 2015) [hereinafter DOJ
MANUAL]; Release No. 44969, SEC, Report of Investigation Under Section 21(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Oct. 23, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport
/34-44969.htm [http://perma.cc/9PRB-VRK8].
149. See Rashna Bhojwani, Deterring Global Bribery: Where Public and Private
Enforcement Collide, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 66, 74 (2012).
150. See WITTEN ET AL., supra note 129, § 7.04.
151. Lucinda A. Low et al., The Uncertain Calculus of FCPA Voluntary Disclosures 1
(Mar. 27–28, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/spring07/
World%20Bank%20Anticorruption%20Programs/Low%20-%20The%20Uncertain%20
Calculus%20of%20FCPA%20Voluntary%20Disclosures.pdf [http://perma.cc/V4D4-A696].
152. The OECD Convention provides that parties with concurrent jurisdiction must
“consult with a view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution” only
“at the request of one of them.” OECD Convention, supra note 5, at 8. It also recommends
that member countries “consult and otherwise co-operate with competent authorities in other
countries . . . through such means as the sharing of information spontaneously or upon
request, provision of evidence, extradition, and the identification, freezing, seizure,
confiscation and recovery of the proceeds of bribery of foreign public officials.” Id. at 26.
Although the OECD Convention appears to envision a single prosecution for cases of
foreign bribery, it certainly does not advocate or insist upon that in every instance, and its
reliance on a request for consultation among states reduces its effectiveness in eliminating
duplicative prosecutions. It seemingly recognizes the practical reality that different states
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earlier illustrate, the challenges posed by the rising tide of multinational
enforcement have been far from fully addressed.153 Regulators have
arguably met with greater success in similar challenges of fostering clarity
and coordination in other legal contexts, including in the enforcement of
antitrust violations by authorities in different countries and in the
enforcement of U.S. law violations by federal and state authorities with
overlapping jurisdiction. Even where major challenges remain in those
contexts, they still may provide instructive examples from which the
international anticorruption enforcement community can learn.
A. Coordination in Antitrust Enforcement
In the realm of antitrust enforcement, state action—by specific
legislation, agency action, and/or international negotiation and agreement—
has been arguably more effective in addressing the concerns posed by
potentially duplicative prosecutions across borders and enforcement
authorities. Under the United States’s 1994 International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act (IAEAA), the DOJ and the Federal Trade
Commission can negotiate specific civil and criminal antitrust multilateral
assistance treaties (MLATs), as well as bilateral “positive comity”
agreements, directly with other nations.154 These international agreements
outline processes by which national authorities refer cases to one another,
coordinate enforcement approaches, and, ideally, reduce unnecessary and
duplicative multiple prosecutions.155
One example of such enforcement coordination in antitrust and
competition matters is the 1998 Positive Comity Agreement between the
United States and the European Union156 (EU). This treaty sets out
procedures by which “each Party will normally avoid allocating
enforcement resources to deal with anti-competitive activities that occur
principally in and are directed principally towards the other Party’s
territory,”157 though only where “the competition authorities of the other
Party are able and prepared to examine and take effective sanctions under
their law to deal with those activities.”158 The treaty thus clearly envisions
a form of voluntary deference by one national enforcement authority in

will open their own independent investigations and pursue them as far as and in whatever
direction they please, until a foreign enforcement agency approaches them with a formal
request to consult. See U.N. Convention Against Corruption, at 29, opened for signature
Dec. 9, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 (entered into force Dec. 14, 2005); see also id. at 30–41
(setting forth principles of international cooperation to increase effectiveness of cross-border
enforcement).
153. See supra Parts I, II.
154. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 57b-1,
1311–12, 6201–12 (2012).
155. Id.
156. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
European Communities on the Application of Positive Comity Principles in the Enforcement
of Their Competition Laws, U.S.-E.U., June 4, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1070.
157. Id. art. I.2(b).
158. Id.
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favor of another, in the conduct of fact investigation, prosecution, and/or
imposition of penalties.
This is just one example showing how the United States and the EU—
major players with interests in enforcing antitrust laws and combating
anticompetitive practices across borders—have been able to coordinate and
establish cooperation to reduce the costs associated with duplicative
prosecution and thereby streamline international enforcement. While the
treaty focuses on ceding enforcement action where the other jurisdiction is
“able and prepared”—a condition that may be less prevalent in the
corruption context in jurisdictions with high levels of corruption—it is
clear, as discussed earlier, that less developed countries are finding their
prosecutorial footing in corruption matters in recent years.159
And even beyond the explicit legal rules and agreements that can limit
the potential for duplicative enforcement, more informal and voluntary
coordination by relevant authorities can also have a significant impact. As
one Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division noted:
A[nother] approach is the allocation of jurisdiction over conduct with
multijurisdictional effects to one agency by another agency that also has a
claim of jurisdiction. This model operates on a specific case by case
basis, and is not characterized by elaborate rules or agreements. Rather,
basic agreements would establish factors for the delineation of
jurisdiction. This approach involves deference to another agency
perceived to have greater interests in the conduct.160

That is to say, transnational enforcement authorities can (and often do)
exercise their discretion to coordinate their cases and avoid the most
duplicative prosecutions and penalties, even when not required to do so.
This appears to be a somewhat more reliable approach in the realm of
antitrust enforcement than in that of international anticorruption efforts. To
be sure, efficient coordination in international antitrust enforcement still
requires much voluntary action and the will to cooperate effectively among
multinational authorities. But additional legal frameworks also encourage
and facilitate that coordination and make it arguably less ad hoc than
coordination in international anticorruption efforts. It seems intuitive that
when coordination is pursued ex ante, as a matter of public policy addressed
by general legislation and treaties, it stands a better chance to establish
principled guidelines than when it is pursued on a case-by-case basis, as
enforcement authorities address particular sets of facts in real time.

159. See supra INTRODUCTION.
160. Andrew C. Finch, Counsel to the Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Speech Before the ABA Administrative Law Section Fall Meeting: Facing the
Challenge of Globalization: Coordination and Cooperation Between Antitrust Enforcement
Agencies the U.S. and E.U. (Oct. 22, 2004). In that speech, Mr. Finch noted that “antitrust
has arrived relatively late to the discussion of the international implications of law
enforcement and methods to coordinate with foreign colleagues.” Id. But international
anticorruption enforcement has come even later to the game and could look to the experience
of antitrust enforcement in seeking ways to create a global regime in which multinational
enforcers work together for the public good.
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B. Parallel Enforcement in Domestic Cases
Looking to domestic law enforcement policies and practices in the
United States may offer some principles for when cooperation—and
perhaps deference—is most appropriate. In the United States, various
federal and state, criminal and civil enforcement authorities often share
overlapping authority over the same conduct.161 Among the many factors
they consider, and are encouraged to consider, in deciding whether to bring
criminal charges or civil or administrative actions is whether other
authorities with concurrent jurisdiction have already imposed adequate
penalties and what the collateral consequences of additional penalties might
be.162
For example, when determining whether criminal charges against an
organization are warranted and necessary, or whether regulatory
enforcement alone is sufficient, the DOJ will consider “the strength of the
regulatory authority’s interest; the regulatory authority’s ability and
willingness to take effective enforcement action; the probable sanction if
the regulatory authority’s enforcement action is upheld; and the effect of a
non-criminal disposition on federal law enforcement interests.”163 In
addition, the DOJ’s policy on dual and successive prosecutions, or “Petite
Policy,” is generally to defer criminal prosecution where the same
underlying conduct has already formed the basis for a state criminal
prosecution.164 Though it is under no constitutional or other legal
obligation to decline such prosecutions, the DOJ has clearly espoused a
prudential policy “to protect persons charged with criminal conduct from
the burdens associated with multiple prosecutions and punishments for
substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s), to promote efficient
utilization of Department resources, and to promote coordination and
cooperation between federal and state prosecutors.”165
161. To give just one especially relevant example, under the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, and
other federal legislation, acts constituting “securities fraud” in the United States can be
prosecuted and sanctioned both criminally by the DOJ and civilly by the SEC. See, e.g.,
Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech: All-Encompassing Enforcement: The Robust Use of
Civil and Criminal Actions to Police the Markets (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/
News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541342996
[http://perma.cc/5FQ2-NBHX];
LINDA
CHATMAN THOMSEN, DEPUTY DIR., SEC, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SECURITIES
MARKET DEVELOPMENT: 2005 PROGRAM § 1.A, https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/
oia_enforce/overviewenfor.pdf (“A [DOJ] criminal prosecution does not preclude the
Commission from taking civil action for the same conduct, and similarly, Commission action
does not generally preclude a subsequent [DOJ] criminal prosecution.”)
[http://perma.cc/NV65-A6E6]. The very same acts can be (and frequently are) prosecuted
by state attorneys general and regulatory agencies as well, depending on the law and
administrative apparatus in the states in which they occur. See. e.g., Amanda M. Rose, State
Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities
Realm), 97 MINN. L. REV. 1343, 1375–86 (2013).
162. See, e.g., DOJ MANUAL, supra note 148, chs. 9-28.1000–.1100.
163. Id. cmt. to ch. 9-28.1100; see also id. chs. 9-27.240–.250.
164. Id. ch. 9-2.031 (entitled “Dual and Success Prosecution Policy (‘Petite Policy’)”).
165. Id. ch. 9-2.031(A). The DOJ’s Petite Policy also makes clear that it applies to
charging decisions, not to precharging investigations, and that satisfaction of the listed
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The DOJ’s domestic policies in this regard, necessarily adjusted
somewhat, seem like a reasonable starting point for articulating
prosecutorial guidelines when it comes to multiple, successive, or
duplicative international enforcement of anticorruption laws. Given the
increase in international prosecutions, and the analytically similar double
jeopardy issues, it would seem that the time has come to apply a double
jeopardy principle in the international context. It may be that factors
similar to those outlined in the Petite Policy are already utilized informally
by the DOJ in analyzing international corruption cases. If so, publicizing
such factors, and making them partially applicable to the SEC, would help
reduce the problems identified in this Article.
Interestingly, both the DOJ and SEC have concurrent authority to enforce
the FCPA, and they routinely exercise it over virtually identical facts.166
While there are differences in jurisdiction and the available remedies, in
large part the two authorities can and often do pursue almost identical
conduct, resulting in essentially duplicate fines.167 This issue is beyond the
scope of this Article, but it is worth noting that many of the issues identified
here as problematic internationally should be addressed at home as well,
where they ought to be simpler to fix.
CONCLUSION
The DOJ and SEC’s actions in cooperating with foreign authorities and
coordinating anticorruption settlements may indicate a growing (if often
tacit and rather informal) acceptance of similar principles that U.S.
authorities already apply more explicitly in other domestic enforcement
matters. However, the United States, along with all countries prosecuting
foreign bribery, should do better in deliberately calculating and balancing
the law enforcement interests of all jurisdictions. As more countries pursue
foreign bribery cases, a greater degree of clarity, predictability, and finality
is needed to prevent the negative consequences of multijurisdictional
enforcement.
The United States—formerly the frontrunner in the antibribery
movement—should take the lead in proactively promoting coordination
among states with a shared interest in enforcement. One approach
suggested by the case and settlement precedents discussed in this Article is
for the United States to outline a process under which its enforcement
criteria in no way suggests that a proposed prosecution must be brought—rather, “traditional
elements of federal prosecutorial discretion continue to apply.” Id.
166. See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 19, at 4 (“DOJ and SEC share enforcement
authority for the FCPA’s antibribery and accounting provisions.”); see also, e.g., supra Part
I.B–C. (discussing the HP, ADM, Alcatel-Lucent, Statoil, and Siemens cases).
167. See RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 19, at 4–5. For recommendations on how the SEC
in particular might reduce duplication in regulatory enforcement, see U.S. CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, EXAMINING U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION ENFORCEMENT: RECOMMENDATIONS ON CURRENT PROCESSES AND
PRACTICES 28–30 (2015) (recommending greater use of memoranda of understanding with
other enforcement authorities, both domestic and international, “to avoid ‘duplication of
efforts, unnecessary burdens on businesses, and ensuring consistent enforcement’”).
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agencies will refer cases of possible corruption to the relevant foreign
authorities, similar to the general process in place in the realm of antitrust
law. Such an approach could be used to reward self-reporting and
cooperation by, for example, expressly allowing cooperating companies to
request participation by other states with an interest in the case, with an
understanding that only the most relevant jurisdiction(s) would investigate
and possibly prosecute wrongdoing.
The twin goals of this approach would be to establish final liability in all
states with a legitimate interest in the alleged conduct and to avoid the
waste, inefficiency, and unfairness inherent in successive investigations and
resolutions. This approach would allow prosecutors to address head-on the
issues of double jeopardy and associated fairness concerns; comity and
good foreign diplomatic relations; collateral consequences to the alleged
offender, victims, and innocent third parties; and practical issues, such as
which authority is best positioned to enforce sanctions.
Of course, there may be instances in which cooperation cannot be
achieved, and authorities will default to one of the current informal
mechanisms for addressing duplicative prosecutions. A transparent policy
of inviting foreign authorities to enter coordinated settlements, however,
would have several benefits. It would eliminate present disincentives to
self-reporting by providing companies with some involvement in the
process and some certainty regarding resolution. It would promote fairness
not only by avoiding duplicative penalties, but also by enabling defendants
to craft a fair defense in light of the jurisdictions involved. Finally, it would
spare scarce investigative and prosecutorial resources.
As demonstrated in this Article, such coordination already occurs in
some cases. Normalizing this type of multijurisdictional coordination may
require a shift in policy across the OECD, and not just in the United States
or a few other countries. The OECD Convention’s Working Group on
Bribery monitors member countries’ efforts to implement the goals of the
Convention and would seem a natural forum and mechanism for facilitating
a shift toward more effective multijurisdictional coordination.
Even if a commitment to international coordination is an optimistic goal
or request, there are other steps that U.S. and foreign enforcement
authorities can take to mitigate the negative impacts of overlapping
jurisdiction. In particular, states should outline more explicit policy
guidelines regarding deferral of prosecution where the same underlying
conduct is, or could be, under investigation in multiple jurisdictions. Akin
to the DOJ’s Petite Policy, such guidelines could take the form of a
“prudential policy” that imposes a higher bar than merely demonstrating
jurisdiction for bringing (or opening) a concurrent (or follow-on) action.
Some factors that this policy might consider are: (1) the strength of the
investigating/prosecuting state’s interest in the case, such as whether the
offender is incorporated in the state or listed on one of its exchanges; (2)
whether a prior or related investigation/prosecution addresses all offending
conduct; and (3) whether the other prosecution(s) satisfies the demands of
deterrence, in view of the defendant’s culpability and compliance. More
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clearly articulating such a policy, with a commitment to fair and principled
multijurisdictional enforcement, would be a step in the right direction
toward mitigating some of the potential risks and costs identified in this
Article.

